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SOCIAL SECURITY

Brown v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1194
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Brown, received social security benefits since August,
1972. In August, 1982, however, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services ("Secretary"), terminated Brown's benefits. In November,
1984, Brown once again filed for the benefits but was denied. Brown
appealed the district court's affirmation of the denial of benefits. On
appeal, Brown argued: (1) his application should have been treated as a
re-opening of his termination of benefits, under which an easier standard of review is applied; (2) the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ")
"non-explicitly" re-opened the case; (3) the ALJ erred in failing to call a
vocational expert to evaluate Brown's complaints of pain and skin cancer; and (4) the ALJ erred in ruling Brown's complaints of pain as not
credible.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the court stated that Brown did not previously appeal his termination of
benefits. Consequently, the Secretary properly considered his application as one for benefits and not one for a re-opening of his termination
of benefits. Accordingly, since the Secretary's decision not to re-open a
previously adjudicated claim is discretionary, it is not a final decision
reviewable under 42 U.S.C. § 4 0 5 (g). Thus, the court held it did not
have jurisdiction to review the Secretary's determination. Second, the
court found that the ALJ invoked the doctrine of resjudicata which precluded a re-opening of the prior termination case. As to Brown's third
and fourth arguments, the court held that the ALJ thoroughly considered both the medical and subjective evidence. Thus, the court held
that the arguments were without merit.
Diaz v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 898 F.2d 774
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Diaz, requested social security benefits from the Secretary
of Health and Human Services ("SHHS"). Diaz's request was denied.
Upon an administrative hearing, the administrative law judge ("ALJ")
also denied Diaz's request for the benefits. The ALJ found that Diaz was
no longer able to perform his earlier job, but that his complaints about
functional limitations were not supported by the record. In reaching
this conclusion, the ALJ rejected the opinion of Diaz's treating physician, and instead relied on the vocational expert's opinion that Diaz retained residual capacity to undertake sedentary work. The district court
declined to reverse SHHS's decision. On appeal, Diaz contended:
(1) SHHS's decision to deny social security benefits was not supported
by substantial evidence; (2) SHHS failed to meet its burden of proof in
showing that Diaz had residual functional capacity and was capable of
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holding a sedentary job; and (3) SHHS erred in refusing to order a psychological examination.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. First,
SHHS's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Second, the
court ruled that SHHS demonstrated that Diaz had residual functional
capacity to hold a sedentary job. The court explained that Diaz's complaints of headaches, pain, and blurred vision were discounted due to
his questionable credibility and the lack of corroborative evidence by the
available expert witnesses. Moreover, evidence existed that Diaz failed
to follow the prescribed treatment regimen for his epilepsy. Third,
SHHS did not err in refusing to order an examination because Diaz
failed to present objective evidence that his depression was separable
from his other non-exertional impairments.
Miller v. McGovern, 907 F.2d 957
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Secretary of Air Force McGovern, denied plaintiff,
Miller, certain benefits pursuant to the military's Survivor Benefit Plan
("SBP"), 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447-55. McGovern appealed, claiming that:
(1) the district court granted summary judgment on a ground not argued by Miller; (2) the "plain meaning" applied by the district court was
erroneous; and (3) McGovern's interpretation of the SBP was permissible and should be afforded substantial deference.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court. The
court concluded that the "plain meaning" the district court assigned to
10 U.S.C. § 1451(e)(3) was erroneous and, therefore, ineffectual. The
court ruled that under § 1451(e)(3), a widow's SBP benefits are to be
offset by the equivalent of the social security payment attributable to her
husband's military service. The court also found that McGovern's interpretation to that effect was permissible and entitled to substantial deference. Consequently, summary judgment was not proper.
Potter v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 905 F.2d 1346
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Potter, applied for disability benefits under Title II of the
Social Security Act. She asserted that symptoms of multiple sclerosis
rendered her disabled in 1980. The district court affirmed the Secretary
of Health and Human Services' ("Secretary") decision denying Potter's
application. Potter appealed, contending the Secretary's decision:
(1) was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) was invalid because incorrect legal standards were applied.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Secretary's decisions. First, there
was substantial evidence in the record to support the Secretary's determination that Potter was not disabled prior to the end of 1981. The
court explained that none of the reports submitted by Potter identified a
disability as of 1981. Retrospective diagnosis without evidence of actual
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disability is insufficient. Second, the Secretary properly relied on a five
step procedure outlined in the Social Security Act to determine that
prior to December 31, 1981, Potter could have returned to work.

